Evolution of Security

Leave your shoes on?

2008-07-30T10:53:00.005-04:00

Wouldn’t it be great to show up at a checkpoint and just when you were reaching down to untie your shoes, you heard an officer say “You can leave your shoes on.”

The TSA is well aware that the removal of shoes is not our most popular policy. In fact, it probably ranks up there with root canals and doing your taxes.

What you’ve seen up until now has been our officers enforcing an unpopular policy that is based on the unfortunate truth that intelligence tells us that terrorists are still very interested in hiding items in their shoes.

Today, the X-ray is simply the quickest, most effective way to ensure nothing is hidden inside. What you haven’t seen is all the hard work that’s been going on behind the scenes trying to find an alternative. Our experts and the private sector have been looking for ways to screen footwear while allowing passengers to keep their shoes on for quite some time.

Last year, TSA tested a shoe scanner from General Electric in Orlando. Today, we’re testing shoe scanning technology at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) from L3 Communications. If all goes well, these tests could lead the way to quelling of one of our most unpopular policies.

LAX received two units from L3 Communications last week. Since this is a test to collect data, passengers will still need to remove their shoes prior to walking through the magnetometer. Hey, don’t kill the messenger. I’m just giving you a heads up! :)

DHS Science and Technology, a sister agency of TSA, is also testing this shoe scanner and will collaborate with us on their findings.

Programs like the shoe scanner, the checkpoint friendly laptop bag and diamond lanes are not only good for passenger convenience but they help to reduce the chaos and frustration at checkpoints. This is good for security because it allows more than 2,000 Behavior Detection Officers to better focus on passengers with harmful intent.

And yes, we are going to answer your top 10 questions. :)

Pay For Performance; Good For Security

2008-07-23T14:19:00.005-04:00

The next time you’re in the security line at your local airport, contemplating the 3-1-1 liquids rule or the possibility of making it home in time to tuck your kids into bed, take a quick look at the officers at the checkpoint.

Right there in front of you are some of the most tested professionals inside or outside of government. At any time, 24/7/365 TSA, DHS or GAO testers can and do test our officers’ ability to detect items that could be used in an attack. Our belief is that rewarding excellent performers is one way to motivate a workforce with a deadly serious job to do. Conversely, not rewarding mediocre performance based solely on seniority is a way to motivate people to step up or consider other career options.

Yesterday, our Deputy Administrator, Gale Rossides testified before members of Congress on TSA’s pay-for-performance compensation system. Along side colleagues from the intelligence and law enforcement communities, she clearly explained that our system provides incentives to the best performing officers. Nowhere is this more important than on the frontlines of our nation’s efforts to keep its citizens safe. We thought you might find her opening statement interesting and thought provoking. For her more comprehensive, written testimony, click here.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Oral Statement
of
GALE ROSSIDES
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, TSA
Before the
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JULY 22, 2008

Good afternoon, Chairman Akaka, Ranking Member Voinovich, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss TSA's progress on our pay-for-performance system, known as PASS [Performance Accountability and Standards System].

I am honored to appear and represent the thousands of TSA employees, our Transportation Security Officers [TSOs], who serve to ensure the safety and security of 2 million passengers a day. These women and men are dedicated security professionals with one of the most difficult jobs in government. These Officers are the most tested in the Federal workforce. Contrary to what so often is the headline grabber about attrition, 22,000 of our Officers have been with TSA from the beginning. They have participated in the largest stand-up of a Federal agency in fifty years. They have stayed with us as we responded to the evolving threat by continuously enhancing the security process, while also building the infrastructure and the human capital system to properly pay, train, reward, and recognize their performance. They stayed for the mission.

There are two reasons TSA relies on pay for performance. Security is the first and foremost. Second, it is to instill a culture of high performance and accountability in our workforce.

Performance on the job has a special meaning for us. Let me be very direct. Our job is to stop a terrorist attack. Our Officers work in an environment in which 99.9 percent of the people they see every day are not a threat, but the threats against our aviation system remain. TSOs want to get passengers through the security checkpoint with a high degree of confidence that they have stopped anyone seeking to do harm—your safety is their priority.

How does PASS improve security? When you get paid more to do a better job, you do a better job. PASS is targeted to reward excellent performance. That is an incentive to perform at the highest level to which you are capable. PASS rewards the individual performance necessary to achieve TSA's organizational goals and that increases security.

TSA's pay-for-performance system is driven by validated data. Its performance metrics are standardized, measurable, observable and almost completely objective. PASS has been adjusted based on feedback from our Officers about what the real job is.

Our Officers have told us they want a pay-for-performance system because they know what is at stake: they want to know that their fellow officers are equally competent. But building a pay-for-performance system takes time. It takes employee engagement. It takes leadership. It takes flexibilities in the human capital system. It takes continuous improvement and it takes constant communication. But for us, it is essential. In my thirty years of Federal service, twenty-three of them with the General Schedule, I have never been more sure of anything: The pay-for-performance system is the best way in this post 9/11 environment, for TSA to manage and ensure the quality of persons on the front line.

The effectiveness of PASS is proven by the statistics. More than half of our TSO workforce has been on the job for four years or more. The 2007 DHS Annual Employee Survey validates that 94 percent of TSOs said the work they do is important. Eighty-three percent said they know how their work relates to the agency's goals and priorities.

TSA supervisors have a significant stake in the PASS program as well, and they are evaluated on how effectively and fairly they administer it. Successful implementation of the program is a component of their own PASS ratings.

At TSA, pay for performance ensures the technical proficiency of the people on the front line. Our goal is for our Officers to be switched on and always at the ready. Pay for performance drives their higher level of performance because their earning power is directly tied to their learning power.
The Senior Leadership Team of TSA is passionately dedicated to our people and the principles of pay-for-performance. We are committed to using the flexible human capital system provided under ATSA to make TSA a model performance-based organization. We are building a culture in which our workforce is actively engaged. It is through listening and working collaboratively with all of our Officers to find solutions that we will continue to meet our challenges.

While significant advances are being made in our technology and security processes, each day's success begins and ends with our Officers. They are TSA's greatest investment. They are everyday heroes. In this war on terror, the individual motivation of our Officers to excel is critical to our success. We rely on the best to do the best at this security job. Pay-for-performance is vital to sustaining this top performing workforce.

Calling All Lurkers

2008-07-18T17:08:00.010-04:00

We have about 4000 unique readers on our blog per week and only a very small percentage of those readers comment. We’d like to hear from the silent majority. You know – the lurkers.

We're going to dedicate this post to taking your top 10 questions. Ask away and on Monday at close of business, I'll begin tallying up the questions and we'll see to it that the top 10 questions are answered. We’ll try to get them all posted within a week.

Of course, these are aviation security related questions, so please don’t ask me what the meaning of life is. (42) The blog team probably doesn’t know how to fix your stove or build a suspension bridge, so save those questions for another blog.

Before all of our current commenters get their feelings hurt, we appreciate you guys and of course we want to hear from you too, so even if you’ve asked a question before, ask again if you haven’t received an answer yet.

We’ll see how this goes. This may be a good manageable way to get your questions answered 10 at a time.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

NOTE: to see comments above 200 click on the "post a comment" link to make a comment (you can view the 200+ comments from the blogger.com website). Or Click Here.

Myth Buster: TSA's Watch List is More Than One Million People Strong

2008-07-14T15:46:00.003-04:00

MYTH: TSA's watch list has more than 1 million names on it.

BUSTER: First, TSA doesn't have a watch list. TSA is a customer of the Terrorist Screening Center, a component of the FBI that is responsible for maintaining the consolidated terrorist watch list. The center has said publicly that there are less than 400,000 individuals on the overall consolidated watch list, 95 percent of whom are not U.S. persons and the vast majority of whom are not even in the U.S.

TSA uses two subsets of this list, the no-fly and selectee lists. These small subsets of the overall list are reserved for known or suspected terrorists that reach a threshold where they should not be allowed to fly, or should get additional scrutiny.

MYTH: There are 1 million names on U.S. Government terror watch lists.

BUSTER: There are less than 400,000 individuals on the consolidated terrorist watch list and less than 50,000 individuals on the no-fly and selectee lists. Individuals on the no-fly and selectee lists are identified by law enforcement and intelligence partners as legitimate threats to transportation requiring either additional screening or prohibition from boarding an aircraft.

MYTH: The ACLU's math estimates that there will be 1 million people on government watch lists this July.

BUSTER: Assumptions about the list are just plain wrong. While a September 2007 report may have said that there are 700,000 records on the terrorist watch list and it was growing by an average of 20,000 per month, that is not the same as the number of individuals on the watch lists. A new "record" is created for every alias, date-of-birth, passport and other identifying information for watch listed suspects. The ACLU does not account for the name-by-name scrub that took place in the Fall of 2007 by all government agencies involved with the lists through the Terrorist Screening Center. This review reduced the no-fly and selectee lists by almost 50 percent and eliminated records of individuals that no longer pose a threat.

MYTH: Ted Kennedy, Catherine Stevens, and "Robert Johnson" are all on the no-fly or selectee watch lists.

BUSTER: These individuals are NOT on the no-fly or selectee lists. They, and other Americans, are being misidentified as individuals on the selectee list. Today watch list matching is carried out by the airlines for every passenger manifest. In cases when individuals with similar names are misidentified, folks experience inconvenience like no remote check-in but they are allowed to fly. Once TSA's Secure Flight initiative is in place the number of misidentifications will be GREATLY reduced. Under Secure Flight, TSA assumes watch list matching from dozens of airlines and implements a uniform, efficient matching process. Today the Department of Homeland Security's Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) is a single point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution regarding difficulties they experienced during their travel screening at transportation hubs--like airports and train stations--or crossing U.S. borders.

FACTS ABOUT TERROR WATCH LISTS:

Terror watch lists keep legitimate terror threats off of airplanes every day, all over the world.

According to the Congress' investigative arm, the Government Accountability Office, terror watch lists have, "helped combat terrorism" and "enhanced U.S. counterterrorism effort."

Our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities work tirelessly and in some cases under great physical danger to identify individuals that pose a terror threat. The simple truth is that it would be negligent to not use this information to our advantage.

Christopher

EoS Blog Team

Lost & Found in LA: $30,000.00 Watch Returned to Passenger

2008-07-11T15:09:00.011-04:00

One has to figure, over the course of any trip, be it business or pleasure, there are dozens of opportunities to lose things.

Hotels, shuttles, restaurants, buses, rental cars, airplanes, taxis, restrooms, and yes, even security checkpoints present "opportunities" to lose that special piece of jewelry, the cell phone, laptop, bluetooth, belt, hat, car keys, DVD player, passports and the list goes on and on, up to and including dentures (which we have actually found, and no, weren't required to be removed).

Solving the mystery of who belongs to what is incredibly labor-intensive but TSA employees across the country work to get these items back to their rightful owner; all in addition to their “regular” jobs of protecting the traveling public. It should be clear, TSA doesn't manage lost and found in all airports, some police departments, air carriers or airports can handle lost and found responsibilities too.

I know of cases where our people have found a cell phone owner simply by calling a number in the address book. We have had success using Web sites like MySpace to find the owner of a lost driver's license. We've even had cases of officers calling that grocery store from the club card on key chains to find an owner. Whatever the case, we have had some success.

Other times, it's simply impossible to find the owner. There are no identifying characteristics from an owner on a belt, a hat or a scarf. Once in a while though, we'll have a name and number on a walker, cane, stroller or car seat. No lie, people lose this stuff.

So, when an items falls into our lap at an airport like L.A., we'll log it, the time it was found, the terminal, the airline servicing that terminal and the lane; all clues that help us identify the rightful owner, should that person call to claim it.

I spoke with Hector Moreno, an officer at LAX who provided this brief tour of our lost and found operation.

While I was with Hector, a passenger had come into the office to claim an item, here is his story.

Additionally, I received an email last week from a passenger who wanted to applaud the work officers had done to reunite him with his watch.

Jeffrey Neuman flew through LAX around Mother's Day and inadvertently left his collector Cartier watch in one of our bins. Knowing the value of his watch, he fully expected to never see it again. Boy, was he in for a surprise.

So given the huge volume of items that are left at the checkpoints at LAX and I am sure around the country, the next time one of your items goes missing, give the local lost and found a call, it's quite possible we have it.

However, don't wait too long, as we only hold onto items valued at less than 500 bucks for 30 days, at which point they are donated to the General Services Administration, the government's entity responsible for property. More expensive items are held at our national HQ warehouse for up to two years.

One last thought, if possible, put your name on your items or tape a business card to an item, especially laptops, it sure makes the process of reuniting these items with passengers much easier.

Nico

EoS Blog Team

Shocking, but False

2008-07-10T17:13:00.003-04:00

Some of you have asked about the Washington Times Blog Piece that talked about shock bracelets. We reached out to the Department of Homeland Security’s Science & Technology Directorate to see if there was any validity to this story, and there isn’t.

Here’s what S&Ts John Verrico posted as a comment on the Washington Times blog, and we wanted to make sure all of our readers saw it was well.

DHS-S&Tspokesman said...

Shocking, but False

Sometimes it just amazes me how these stories evolve. Let me start off by saying that the Department of Homeland Security’s Science & Technology Directorate nor TSA have been pursuing shock bracelets for airline passengers as alleged by the Washington Times Blog.

This allegation stemmed from a misleading video posted on the Lamberd Website which depicts an ID bracelet that would contain identifying information as well as the ability to stun the wearer. The company claims to connect use of such a device to DHS and TSA, but no discussions between these agencies has ever taken place.

This all originated from a meeting held two years ago with a private company representative (not Lamberd) who proposed bracelet technology in response to the TSA's desire to find less-than-lethal means to detain an apprehended suspect. The bracelet was never intended to replace boarding passes, contain ID information or be worn by all passengers as asserted in the Lamberd video and discussed in the Washington Times Blog.

The hypothetical use of the bracelet would have been for transporting already apprehended prisoners and detainees at prisons and border patrol facilities, and DHS was looking to see if there were potential air travel applications for apprehended suspects.

This concept was never funded or supported by the DHS or TSA and hasn’t even been discussed for two years. The letter circulating throughout the blogosphere from Paul Ruwaldt was not addressed to Lamberd and merely states the DHS was interested in learning more about the technology.

Neither side followed up. DHS/TSA does NOT support the asserted use and has not pursued the development of such technology. - John VerricoDHS S&T Spokesman

Bob

EoS Blog Team

The evolution of the Bag: Going "Checkpoint Friendly"

2008-07-07T17:33:00.010-04:00

We’ve spent a lot of time talking about the evolution of the security checkpoint here during the past seven months. Some ideas like the Diamond Lanes and our screening of the MacBook Air have been tremendously well received while other topics like the science behind 3-1-1 and our recent ID requirement have generated lots of, let’s just call them spirited debates… In all cases, we’re working to create a system that is not only better for security but easier for passengers to navigate. We do this not because of a need to be loved, but because we increase security through a calmer checkpoint (think bad guys sticking out of the crowd more in a relaxed environment).

One project we’re currently working on that has been widely discussed on the Internet and several blogs is a “checkpoint friendly” laptop bag. This bag would allow our officers a clear, unobstructed view of the laptop and allow passengers to keep the laptop in the bag during screening.

Why do we keep calling it a “checkpoint friendly” bag you may ask? Because the simple truth is that if we were to “certify” bags or “TSA approve” bags, we’d be here for months and maybe years and not weeks developing an approved government standard for laptop bags. By not certifying or approving, we leave it to industry to develop bags that work and get out of their way. We expect these bags to hit the market in the Fall, in plenty of time for holiday shopping this year.

To support private industry’s foray into this new and exciting field, we have opened up our operations to bag manufacturers for a look see. The TSA screening operations at Ontario, California, Austin, Texas and Washington-Dulles have invited manufacturers in to see how their prototypes appear on our x-ray machines, both AT and standard. Officers working these checkpoints are providing valuable feedback on which bags work and which ones need more work. After all, the ultimate authority on whether a laptop will have to be removed from a bag will rest with the officer working the x-ray machine.

Once manufacturers think that their bags are indeed “checkpoint friendly,” then we expect them to produce bags for the market. Some things to look for in your “checkpoint friendly” bag, once they’re on the market, include:

o No metal snaps or zippers underneath or on-top of where the laptop would be X-rayed
o Plastic works much better than anything metal
o No pockets either underneath or on-top of where the laptop would be X-rayed
o Bags with thick dividers may cause officers to pull the bags for secondary screening and do not provide clear images
o No emblems or seals that are thick and placed on top of or underneath where the laptop would be
o Bags greater than 30 inches in length when unfolded often do not fit on a single image, requiring the TSA officer to view the contents of the bag as multiple images, which takes longer. It is faster to keep the fully opened bag to an opened length of 30 inches or less (although not critical for image clarity).
o If the bag does not present a clear image to the officer, he or she should be able to have easy access to the laptop computer for secondary screening to speed the process.

The key is a clear image of the laptop inside the bag. If wires, batteries or cords are on top of or under the laptop, it’s going to have to come out; which will slow security and anger a passenger that just bought this new “checkpoint friendly” bag.

So, all this talk about laptops may leave you asking, “Why do laptops have to come out of the bag today?” The reason is so we can get a good, clear look at them. It’s easy to hide items inside of or underneath laptops. By removing the laptop from the bag and placing it in a bin, the officer can quickly make the determination that the laptop hasn’t been altered or is hiding anything.

Christopher
EOS Blog Team

Yet Another ID Post...With Some Answers to Your Questions

2008-07-03T18:46:00.012-04:00

The ID topic has elicited lots of emotion. Many posters feel very strongly on this topic and I respect that discussion and their positions. This is a case where taking steps for aviation security touch other, related controversies that are larger societal/political issues. To the extent that there are legal issues relating to TSA’s actions, they will be resolved elsewhere.

I would like to move on to other topics since we are not going to solve the several complex issues here and we do have lots of other security issues to discuss.

The essential point is that validating a passenger’s identity matters a great deal from a security point of view. Our intelligence, military, and law enforcement colleagues -- at great risk to themselves -- develop sensitive information about potential attacks and the people behind them. They get that information to us so that TSA can do its part and keep those people off aircraft. It is our obligation to protect passengers and crew using the best information that we can get. That is what we are doing.

We will leave this open for further discussion and then move on with our next post. But before we move on, I wanted to provide answers to some of your questions.

Q: If requiring ID is truly instrumental in keeping the flying public safe, why did it take the TSA until June of 2008 to institute that policy?

A: Building blocks.

TSA put up a national security baseline in 2002. This involved creating the organization, staffing, buying and installing equipment -- and the very familiar magnetometer/x-ray checkpoint. No-Fly and Selectee lists were established and given to airlines for them to match versus their ticketed passengers. Airlines continued the pre-9/11 practice of hiring contractors locally to check ID’s. That created a basic physical screening process at the checkpoint (TSA operated) and a basic person screening process through the airlines.

In 2006 and 2007 TSA strengthened the person screening process by adding a new layer (behavior) and improving the watchlist matching. Along with the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), TSA scrubbed the No-Fly and selectee lists and essentially cut them in half. (CIA and FBI are the major players nominating people to the Watchlists, TSC maintains a consolidated, accurate, government-wide watchlist, and TSA operationally makes sure No-Flys don’t fly.) The system is vulnerable to people evading watchlists if they use a fake identity with the airline and then show a fake ID at the checkpoint. This vulnerability was called out by many on-line posters (and noticed by us) and we took a major step last year to upgrade the ID checks by integrating the checking of ID’s with the rest of TSA’s security. That is why you now have TSA officers, with lights and loupes examining ID’s throughout the system.

The ID requirements we’re talking about here, are the next building blocks to be added. First, to require identity verification and better define the hierarchy of good ID’s -- hence the ‘gold standard.’

We know that terrorists use fake ID's to evade security scrutiny. While I recognize that there are very valid philosophical issues and debates around ID’s, for TSA, this issue is about closing vulnerabilities and stopping attacks.

There is considerable operational complexity to resolving the identity of a person without an ID real-time at the checkpoint. It is getting done now but is still clunky at times. We will get better over the coming months. In answer to the question, all of the building blocks mentioned above, needed to be in place. They are now and aviation is safer as a result

Q: What will TSA do if a majority of the states refuse to issue REAL ID cards to their respective citizens?

A: We would attempt to verify identity with other means, it would just take longer.

Q: If TSA believes that 1) checking ID increases safety to the flying public and 2) the no-fly list is there to catch terrorists, then why are the TSOs that check IDs at the airport not comparing names to those on the no-fly list?

A: Because those checks are done before the boarding pass is issued. It is done in the background by a combination of the airlines and TSA. The system is automated and close matches are resolved on a one by one basis. For more on issues about passengers who have problems because someone else with their name is on the list, please see DHS Trip.

Q: Since it has been claimed by TSA that the 3-1-1 rule was implemented due to the circumstances surrounding the London bomb plot, what position will TSA take if the defendants are found not-guilty?

A: I can’t comment on the U.K. legal system but “certainty” in a criminal proceeding is very carefully defined. I can tell you from the intelligence and law enforcement information developed in this case that the threat to U.S. aircraft was chilling, lethal and the clock was ticking when they were arrested. Had that plot not been discovered, there may well have been thousands of casualties. Doubt about the reality or efficacy of that threat? Zero.

Kip

ID Q&A

2008-07-02T12:00:00.005-04:00

Okay, we continue to receive questions on the ID requirement. I will attempt to answer as many as possible below. It’s kind of a virtual chat. We’d love to be able to do a live chat and we’re exploring that technological possibility.

There is also the very real possibility that civil people can agree to disagree…which is the direction I believe we’re heading.

Here goes:

Anonymous said... Could you please elaborate on those approximately 20 persons that weren´t allowed to fly? June 23, 2008 4:51 PM

Sure. The 20 people of the 10 million plus that did fly were turned away from the checkpoint. Some went and got their IDs, some tried to fly from other airports (and were stopped) and the rest just didn’t come back.

Phil said... TSA: If the people on your blacklist are so dangerous that we must restrict their movement, why don't you send the police to arrest them and put them in front of a judge? June 23, 2008 4:52 PM

Couple things here Phil. First off, TSA doesn’t have a “blacklist.” We use two of the Terrorist Screening Center’s watch lists, no-fly and selectee. The no-fly is reserved for known threats to aviation, most of which are not in this country and are not exactly sitting around, waiting for a visit from any government official, U.S. or otherwise. While the exact number of “no-flys” is secret, there are many, many less than 500,000. No Ted Kennedy and other are NOT on the no-fly list. If a person truly is, they “NO FLY” get it?

The other list is the selectee list. This list is for people that require additional screening before they fly. They fly after undergoing additional screening..

Anonymous said... So you're saying that you've been letting 10 people too dangerous to fly on planes each and every day since your misbegotten agency started? June 23, 2008 5:03 PM

Huh??? What we’re saying is that identity matters and we’re strengthening the system by verifying ID.

Chris Boyce said... 1. Where is the privacy impact assessment for the new form and the obviously commercial datamining check? I don't recall seeing it on line, nor do I remember a public comment period. We wouldn't be breaking the law, would we???

No Chris, we wouldn’t be breaking the law. A privacy impact assessment has been conducted and is pending review at DHS prior to being posted. There is no public comment period for Privacy Impact Assessments. Also, commercial “datamining” is not an accurate description of what is happening. We are simply using commercial data as a way to assist individuals in verifying their identity when they otherwise are unable to establish it through an acceptable identity document. Commercial data is not being used to predict criminal or terrorist activity.

2. Why would Hawley state on CNN that he was confident that his new policy would withstand a legal challenge if it weren't retaliatory in nature? Surely even he would know that it's unlikely that lawsuits are a known Al Qaeda tactic. June 23, 2008 5:13 PM

Huh? The question from the reporter was, “Would this new procedure withstand a lawsuit?” The answer was yes. Had the question been, “Will Al Qaeda sue you over this new procedure,” the answer would have been different.

Marshall's SO said... OK, so now we know what kinds of questions travelers, even those who are lying, are asked when they say they "forgot" their ID, i.e., birthdate, previous address, political party affiliation, where are you getting the data from to ask such questions? Can you verify that whatever data service you are using has "good" information? June 23, 2008 5:24 PM

Thanks Marshall. Just for the record, we’re not asking “political party affiliation” as you suggest nor are we asking other sensitive question like religion, charitable donations or things like that (see Kip’s comment on the ID post from the other day). Based on the publicly available data we’re using, we have a range of questions and it’s not a one strike and you’re out procedure. There are a number of questions we ask simply to determine if you are who you say you are. That’s it.

Because of the number of questions that could be asked, we’re also preventing someone from memorizing a simple set of facts to game the system.

Anonymous said... The average length of time for these ridiculous checks tells us nothing. What was the longest length of time you detained a citizen seeking to travel by air who did not have an ID? What was the shortest? June 23, 2008 5:40 PM

I feel like the average length of time is an important data point on how this is going. That said, the longest length of time we took to make an identity verification decision was 47 minutes. Yes that’s a long time and may have caused that one individual to miss his or her flight. The quickest is in the seconds.

Don’t know if the person waiting 47 minutes was a citizen or not but detained is not an accurate term either.

Boy, this anonymous character sure asks a lot of questions. :)

Travel_Medic said... how is checking IDs add anything to security when they are not compared to any list. June 23, 2008 7:31 PM

Hello Doc. You are compared to no-fly and selectee lists by the airlines. Verifying identity is an additional layer of security because it is added to the other layers…namely travel document checkers and the airlines checks against the above mentioned two watch lists. By doing all three, we’re verifying people are who they say they are, they are not on the no-fly list and their documents are legit.

Just yesterday (July 1), we identified a passenger with a fake social security card. Last week, we found a fraudulent passport. Altered documents are a staple of criminal and terrorist activity. We’re playing offense here and not giving free shots to a patient enemy.

Bob Eucher said... What became of the 20 people that were considered "too dangerous to fly"? Arrested? Let go? June 23, 2008 8:09 PM

Bob, I loved you in Major League (yes the last name is spelled differently but it was too close to resist). We’re not saying these people are “too dangerous to fly.” We’re saying we can’t verify they are who they say they are.

You and others might not care who sits next to you on that plane but we do.

Trollkiller said... ONCE AGAIN, I CHALLENGE THE TSA TO PROVE THE TWO SECTIONS OF 1540 THAT THEY CITE (§ 1540.107 & § 1540.105 (a)(2) ) GIVE THEM ANY AUTHORITY OR RIGHT TO DEMAND AN ID AS A CONDITION OF ACCESS TO A STERILE AREA June 23, 2008 10:06 PM

TROLLKILLER…MY VOICE IS GETTING TIRED FROM SCREAMING. Our attorneys interpret ATSA as saying we can do this, we think it’s important so we’re doing this. I’m not an Internet-based attorney but I probably could play one on TV.

Anonymous said... Again, if the airlines need to verify whether the person boarding the plane is the correct person, they could ask for ID at the gate. But why get the government involved in this? June 23, 2008 10:30 PM

The government is involved in this because we’re charged with aviation security. The airlines were charged with aviation security until TSA was formed in late 2001. We partner with said airlines to ensure no-flys aren’t getting on planes and that we do know who is. We supplement that with trained document checkers, identity verification, behavior detection officers and more than 15 other layers of security.

Anonymous said... So it only took 48 hours before the first reported instance of a question about political affiliation being required. I'll make two predictions: 1) The TSA employees who did this will never be reprimanded in any serious manner; the worst thing they will face will be some additional "training". June 23, 2008 10:35 PM

Nostranonymous, I think Kip was pretty clear when he wrote, “"It's unequivocally not our policy to use political, religious, or other sensitive personal topics as identity validation. If it happened, it was wrong and will not be repeated."

The person that did this made a mistake and has been corrected. Hope you never make a mistake at your job.

Anonymous said... Just out of curiosity, do you guys run my credit report if I show up with no ID? That's the only way I can think of you'd be able to validate I am who I say I am. June 23, 2008 10:46 PM

No. We’re not concerned about that Columbia House bill you never paid in college. We use publicly available info to verify you are who you say you are. It’s taking about 6 minutes for the .00005 percent of people that show up without ID every day.

Andy said... TSA, Question 1: You repeatedly claim this helps improve no-fly list enforcement. As we have told you over and over again, the ID checkers aren't checking names against a list. They're just comparing the name against the boarding pass, and the face to the ID. So, how exactly does this new policy enhance the NFL enforcement?

Andy, you can tell me “over and over again” that document checkers don’t check against the no-fly list and it’s still not the point. Airlines check against the no-fly, trained document checkers check validity of IDs, we verify identity of those without ID. The three work in combination.

You can say 1 plus 1 equals 7 a thousand times and it still doesn’t make it so.

Also, at the risk of hijacking this thread, we are also working on assuming responsibility for watch list matching from the airlines through our Secure Flight program. We believe this will also strengthen the watch list matching and greatly reduce the misidentifications that occur today.

Question 2: What exactly was wrong with the old policy (claim you have no ID, you get a SSSS and you're on your way)? We technically can still do that, and remember when there's a will, there's a way. There's no such thing as perfect security.

You’re 100 percent right on this on point Andy. There is no such thing as perfect security. The combo of the three layers above is better that the old system when anyone shows up, says “no ID” they get screened and go on their merry way. Keeping no-flys off planes is good security and simply patting down someone does not verify identity.

Question 3: Why are you targeting those who simply refuse to show ID? Some people refuse to show ID because of: identify theft concerns; religious reasons; self-privacy reasons; and/or their own principle. We are free people here in the USA, and we have a right not to show ID. People can lie and say they lost their ID, and get by, but those truly wanting to stand up for their rights will be punished. Is there a political connection to this? I think it's blatantly obvious what your purpose is here, TSA. June 24, 2008 5:08 PM

No political connection Andy, none at all. It’s all about strengthening security. There’s no “targeting.” People are showing up without ID and we’re verifying identity, simple as that. We believe we have the legal authority and we believe this increases security.

Anonymous said... Seriously, what happens if you are a physically disabled person and you've never had an official, government-issued photo ID made because you don't drive or use other services that require such ID? I know of several people with seizure disorders and severe dyslexia who have never gotten a state ID because they simply didn't need one. Their sole photo IDs were their college IDs - nothing official or certified. June 25, 2008 7:41 PM

No problem anon, we work with these individuals to establish their identity just like we would anyone else.

yangj08 said... How are you going to deal with foreign passports? I've already heard of someone having to go through a secondary because the TSO at an airport didn't recognize his Dutch passport. He had to go through a secondary (even though he had valid ID). So what happens to those people (especially if it's someone that doesn't speak English very well)? June 26, 2008 2:14 PM

Apples and oranges Yang. If a passenger has legit ID, including a Dutch passport, off they go. Being subjected to additional screening is not the same as verifying ID.

Anonymous said... Can you please elaborate on how the false positive problem will be addressed? I am currently on the Selectee list (and fed up with it) and want to know how soon this madness will end. June 27, 2008 9:04 AM

Well, anonymous does appear to be a very common name so it might just be a misidentification…Honestly, false positives on the selectee list is a different matter. One we’re planning on addressing on the blog in the next few weeks.

I do encourage you to apply for redress at: http://www.dhs.gov.trip/. You’ll also be glad to know (hopefully) that we’re in the process of taking over watch list matching and that will greatly (like 99 percent or greater) reduce misidentifications, which you are much more likely to be rather than a real-deal selectee.

Anonymous said... If they have no weapons, why does it matter WHO they are?
June 27, 2008 2:42 PM

Ah, this is the key argument. We honestly believe that identity is as important as going through the metal detector. Our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities work tirelessly and in some cases under great physical danger to identify individuals that pose a threat to aviation. The simple truth is that it would be negligent to not use this information to our advantage.

*** Anonymous said... How can requiring ID fit within our constitutional rights?

We’ve answered this repeatedly. Our position is that Gilmore v. Gonzalez affirmed our ability to require ID for transportation via air and the law that formed TSA, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) empowers the TSA to make these decisions.

How are the watch lists being improved? How did they come together in the first place? June 27, 2008 6:17 PM

While the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains the lists and TSA is a customer of the no-fly and selectee lists we have worked closely with them to make the lists we use as useful as possible.

As was widely reported several months ago, TSC with TSA’s assistance completed a name by name scrub of the lists (no fly and selectee) and reduced them significantly. This reduces the number of misidentifications, making the list more effective.

As I have also said earlier, we’re also working to assume watch list matching from the airlines and this will have a great impact on the effectiveness of the watch lists.

means to authenticate the passenger's boarding pass.) June 27, 2008 6:50 PM

Abelard said...

1. If requiring ID is truly instrumental in keeping the flying public safe, why did it take the TSA until June of 2008 to institute that policy?

Good question Abelard. We’ve been increasing layers of security for years and now that TSA officers check documents at every airport in the country, we’ve effectively moved the issue and are trying to address this threat.

2. What will the TSA due if a majority of the states refuse to issue READ ID cards to their respective citizens?

What’s READ ID? :) We’re already reading IDs…

We will be prepared to address that issue if it happens. Thusfar, every state in the union is working with DHS on REAL ID.

3. In general, what disciplinary action will be taken against a TSO who asks someone questions regarding their religion or political beliefs in order to verify their identity?

The officer is not coming up with the questions, our 24/7 security operations center is using publicly available databases to determine the most appropriate questions. We’ve already said we don’t see the types of questions you bring up as appropriate.

1) Since anyone can photoshop a boarding pass to match their ID, couldn't someone just buy a ticket under any old name, change their boarding pass, and then proceed through security, with their own, legit ID, since none of your employees are checking the boarding passes to see if a) they're legit, or b) if the person whose name is on it is on your "no fly" list?

Why do that when someone could just print a fake boarding pass at home? That’s why we have these layers I keep talking about. No-fly passenger forges boarding pass at home, shows up and has to beat document checkers, behavior detection officers, and the other layers. No self respecting terrorist is going to say “no ID” when he/she knows they’ll get the extra attention this process now entails.

See, we’re doing is forcing people with bad intentions into additional layers of security here.

2)What happens when someone truly forgets their ID, and the company you contract out with to verify has the wrong information?

We don’t contract out with anybody. TSA employees at our ops center verify the identity with publicly available databases.

3) How does this stop someone who is not a known terrorist?

Totally clean skins are still subjected to the other layers of security, particularly behavior detection officers.

4) Why, in their right mind, would a known terrorist use a legitimate ID to buy their ticket? Wouldn't they just get a good fake?

My sentiments exactly. See above.

5) What if someone is a forgetful person...how many times can they have forgotten their ID?? June 27, 2008 10:09 PM

As many as they want….

Hope these answers helped clear up our position and why we think this is so important. As I wrote in the beginning, it’s perfectly acceptable for rational, intelligent people to disagree on important issues.

Christopher

EoS Blog Team

Aviation News of the Weird

2008-07-01T12:17:00.004-04:00

While sifting through our alerts, we often see stories we have to read twice just to make sure we're not reading the Onion.

There's always crazy stuff going on in the aviation industry, and if you're like us, you love to read about it.

Enjoy!

Bob

EoS Blog Team

07/08/2008

Man Hides Mace Where Sun Doesn't Shine

Not Exactly the Proper Use of an Emergency Slide

07/09/2008

Snakes Almost on a Plane

07/10/2008

Ticks on a Plane???

07/14/2008

Goose on a Plane?

07/18/2008

Oooooklahoma, where a naked passenger comes sweepin' down the plane

ID Update and Word on the Blog

2008-06-27T17:50:00.003-04:00

June 27th Update to ID Requirements:

Now that the new ID requirement is almost one week old, we wanted to provide additional stats. Below are the latest numbers:

Saturday, June 21-Wednesday, June 25:

Total flyers: Approximately 10 million
Flyers without ID: 1705 (.000017 of total flyers)
Flyers denied access: 59 (.000005 of total passengers)
Average wait time for identity verification or decision: 6.9 minutes

And an editorial comment:

A few bloggers have asked us where we are and why we have not responded to questions. Questions like:

“Do these questions being to make you realize why TSA is a joke?”

“Of what are you so afraid that you refuse to address this issue?”

“Unless you are just going to turn the blog iinto (sic) a carnival or circus?”

That last one brings us to an interesting point. As Kip wrote in the opening post of this blog on January 30th, “Our ambition is to provide here a forum for a lively, open discussion of TSA issues… Our hosts…job is to engage with you straight-up and take it from there.”

I think we can all agree that comments like:

“I am just waiting for Kip to mutter "I would have gotten away with it if it wasn't for those meddling kids."

“My tinfoil hat theory is that the TSA knows it doesn't and have given up any pretense of spin control.”

“I agree -- more TSA crap. The sooner y'all are simply arrested for violating our rights, the happier I'll be.”

don’t really bring anything to the larger debate and really don’t beg for nor want a response.

The simple truth is that we’re just about the only government agency engaging in this type of dialogue on security issues and policies and we’re sincerely interested in rational debate and conversation...but we have neither the time nor the desire to respond to random, vitriol filled diatribes that don’t serve passengers or other bloggers in any way.

We’ve used this blog as a method of change and hope we have proven its merit on several occasions (ending the electronics problem in Hooray Bloggers, Diamond Lanes, etc.). These posts and the bloggers' comments have had a positive impact on your experience and mine at the checkpoint. We’re more than willing to engage in a vigorous debate on controversial issues and look forward to many more spirited debates without the poison for poison’s sake.

We’ve certainly proven over the past seven months that we can take a punch but the constant barrage of body (and low) blows without substance would tire even Mike Tyson in his heyday.

Christopher

EOS Blog Team

New ID Requirements: The First 48

2008-06-23T15:43:00.007-04:00

UPDATE: We're aware of reports that someone was asked their political affiliation to verify their identity and it is being looked into. Here's a response given to us by Kip Hawley: "It's unequivocally not our policy to use political, religious, or other sensitive personal topics as identity validation. If it happened, it was wrong and will not be repeated."

We're 48 hours into the new procedure and things have been smooth so far. Approximately 650 people have shown up to security checkpoints without ID and a total of 20 people have not been allowed to fly. That is .0005 percent of the approximately four million people that flew this weekend.

Of the 650 people that showed up without ID, it's taking us an average of 10 minutes to verify their identity and get them on their way. We're able to do this so quickly because of the close coordination of our officers at airports and our 24/7 ops center.

Our critics say this has nothing to do with security and it only affects people that want to exercise their rights to anonymous air travel (which Gilmore v Gonzalez ruled on) and terrorists that aren't good liars.

What these folks aren't getting is that by requiring ID, you're closing that old loophole that allowed (up until Saturday) anyone, good or bad, to show up with any boarding pass (theirs or someone else's), say they lost their ID, get a pat-down and bag check and be on their way. Now, no self respecting terrorist is going to subject him or herself to all the additional attention the new procedures brings. This includes: the possibility of interviews with behavior detection officers, calls about them to our national counter-terrorism ops center, unpredictable physical and bag screening and the real possibility of a chat with a local or federal law enforcement officer. No, now we're funneling people with bad intentions towards our expert-trained document checkers and behavior experts. Could a bad person produce an excellent fake ID and get past document checkers... sure. We know that no single layer is invulnerable, but forcing terrorists into what we want as opposed to what they prefer is just good security.

We'll continue to update the stats here and continue to thank the 99.9995 percent of air travelers that work with us to quickly and easily establish their identity.

Sterling
EoS Blog Team

New ID Requirements Begin Tomorrow

2008-06-20T17:47:00.004-04:00

If you’re flying tomorrow, or anytime in the near future, you may want to make a note that tomorrow is the day the TSA enhances its ID requirements. There have been many misconceptions of the new requirements and I just wanted to attempt to clear things up a little bit.

We’ve all been there. You’ve got a million things to do before you fly. Pay bills, pack, get the kids ready, get your clothes from the dry cleaner, you name it. Whatever it is you have to do, it’s inevitable that you’ll forget at least one of them from time to time. (Hopefully not the kids) I usually forget my toothbrush.

What if you forget your ID? Is your vacation ruined? Are you going to miss your meeting? Are you going to miss the Elvis Costello show this weekend at the Glasgow Royal Concert Hall? Not at all… If you simply state you forgot your ID, we will work with you to verify your ID, you may undergo some additional screening and will be permitted to fly.

On the other hand, if you do not cooperate and state that you’re not willing to show us your ID, you will not be permitted to fly.

You show your ID to test drive a car, view an apartment, buy a house, cash a check, buy cigarettes or alcohol, rent videos and so forth. The list could go on and in some of these circumstances; they hold onto your card or make a copy. We’re just asking for a few moments of your time to ensure your name matches the name on your ticket.

Is this about control? No. It’s about knowing who is getting on the plane. It’s about shifting our focus towards people instead of items on a list. You know as well as we do that you can make a weapon out of anything. The naked human body of someone skilled in martial arts is far more dangerous than most people with a weapon. We know that and we’re shifting towards that line of thought. It is going to be a huge change in our culture, but I and others firmly believe this is the proper evolution path for security.

If our goal is to keep bad people off of planes, and our law enforcement and intelligence partners have gone to the lengths of creating watch lists of known terrorists to keep them off said planes, we have to know for sure that each person who goes through matches the name on their boarding pass and is who they say they are. Most people are not a threat, but we know there are people out there that could pose a threat. Letting anyone go through who says “I don’t want to show my ID” is not good security. It’s not a poke in the eye to certain folks – it’s about security for everyone and we view verifying identity as importantly as we view having passengers pass through metal detectors.

Make sure you also check out Christopher's blog post on IDs.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

The Evolution Continues

2008-06-16T21:27:00.017-04:00

Ronald Reagan National Airport (DCA) became the latest airport to unveil Checkpoint Evolution today. They introduced passengers to the new uniform, training, and new signage all geared towards making the checkpoint a much more relaxing environment while also enhancing security.

We sent Jeremy (best known for his work spinning on our evolution Web site) to Reagan National today to get some photo and video from officers and passengers. Luckily, while Jeremy was on location, there were no sightings of puppies or poultry projectiles.

We’re excited to continue to introduce more passengers to the Evolution of Security and I personally can’t wait to fly through DCA again so I can give it a test drive.

Bob
TSA EoS Blog Team

Why Did the Chicken Cross the Road?

2008-06-13T17:16:00.003-04:00

(Photo is a dramatic recreation)

While this story is not directly related to the TSA, it shows that a bomb can be hidden anywhere by those with fowl intent (pun intended). We thought we'd have a little fun, we hope you enjoy it:

We’re not sure why the chicken crossed the road, but we do know what happened after it did.

On June 10th in Simsbury, Connecticut, police found a pipe bomb stuffed inside of a raw roasting chicken. The chicken was noticed on the side of the road by a passing motorist with a bird’s eye view...

The Police Chief declined to comment due to the pending investigation, so at this point, we’re not sure who hatched this bird-brained plot or why.

It is possible that some misguided youth were egged on to make the poultry projectile. But the real intent is unknown.

The Hartford Police Department's bomb squad took stock in the incident and arrived on scene to detonate the chicken. The road was closed during the detonation, preventing anybody from crossing. (Including Chickens) One member of the squad stated it was poultry in motion (yes we're kidding).

We hope that nobody takes advantage of this incident by using tired old chicken puns (how lame would that be). Remember to report all suspicious activity.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Why is ID Important for Security?

2008-06-11T17:19:00.007-04:00

Last week we announced on our Web site a plan to begin REQUIRING ID from travelers on June 21st. This plan includes enabling our officers to refuse entry into the area beyond the security checkpoint to anyone who does not cooperate with us to establish his or her identity. The exclusive reason to do this is to ensure people are who they say they are and are not gaming the system by using a boarding pass with a fake name; a well-known endeavor of professionals and college kids alike that could potentially circumvent the no-fly list.

Does that mean that if you lose your wallet in the cab on the way to the airport you’re going to have to walk home?

Absolutely not…this rule is solely focused on the passenger who simply will not provide ID or help us establish their identity.

So for the security experts in the crowd (and you know you’re out there) you might be asking yourself a few questions, like:

So if a terrorist shows up and says his dog ate his ID, you’ll just let him go?

The answer is a simple and clear NO. Under today’s rules, you show up, say you lost your ID, get a quick pat down, have your bag searched and you’re on your way. One enterprising fellow has even advocated it as a quicker way through security in the past.

Starting June 21, that person could be subjected to a range of options, including interviews with behavior detection officers and local and/or federal law enforcement, enhanced pat-downs or other options. By increasing our options, people with bad intentions don’t know what exactly to plan against, have to beat multiple layers at the checkpoint and need to be ready to face any number of obstacles to their plans.

Why would a terrorist show up and say he has no ID when he can just show a fake and breeze right through?

Ah hah, that’s where layers of security really come into play. TSA has deployed thousands of highly-trained document checkers to identify fake IDs. We’ve caught everything from Spring Breakers with terrible IDs to fraudulent passports. Our officers are very adept at finding fake documents and work closely with behavior detection officers on a daily basis. The old story of the airline contractor not even looking up at a person while checking IDs is long in the rear view mirror.

This is just an assault on my personal freedoms and security theater.

The only reason we’re doing this is to make sure people are who they say they are and not someone who is a known threat to aviation.

Also, our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities work tirelessly to identify potential threats to aircraft. Enhancing our ID requirements further enables TSA security officers to ensure that individuals are who they say they are when they enter the security checkpoint and not individuals who may pose a threat.

And for all the legal eagles out there, it is my constitutional right to fly without ID.

Under the law that created TSA, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the TSA administrator is responsible for overseeing aviation security (P.L. 107-71) and has the authority to establish security procedures at airports (49 C.F.R. § 1540.107). Passengers who fail to comply with security procedures may be prohibited from entering the secure area of airports to catch their flight (49 C.F.R. § 1540.105(a)(2). Additionally, in Gilmore v. Gonzalez, 435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to a passenger identification policy.

This initiative is simply a way for us to better enforce the no-fly list and ensure the safety of the traveling public. No secret motives, no hidden agendas, just a security enhancement aimed at people trying to game the system.

For more information, go here.

Christopher

EOS Blog Team

Update: 6/14/08

Just a quick note… Our ticket checkers found a fraudulent ID at JFK. Just thought some of you might be interested.

At New York Kennedy Airport (JFK) on Thursday, June 12, a passenger was interviewed by police after attempting to enter into a security checkpoint with a fraudulent ID.

A TSA Travel Document Checker noticed a passenger trying to use a fraudulent New York driver’s license and notified the Port Authority Police Department who came and interviewed her. The Port Authority Police Department released the passenger after issuing a Summons to Appear.

Travel Document Checkers are TSA officers that are specially trained to detect fraudulent IDs and boarding passes to help keep our airports safe and secure.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

A Day in the Life of Checkpoint Evolution at BWI

2008-06-05T18:42:00.004-04:00

Just like scientists strap cameras to wildebeests in the Serengeti, we have strapped a camera to a passenger. For the first time ever, you’ll be able to see exactly what a passenger sees as they walk through their brand new checkpoint at BWI. Watch as the passenger winds through the blue glow of the quiet jungle of machines. It’s like you’re actually there.

Listen to what passengers and Transportation Security Officers have to say about the new checkpoint.

Learn about the new passenger engagement training our Transportation Security Officers are receiving.

Read more about Checkpoint Evolution.

Thanks,

Bob
EoS Blog Team

Is this really a better checkpoint?

2008-06-03T18:11:00.003-04:00

Blogger’s Note:

We thought you’d be interested in hearing directly from an officer first hand how some of the new technologies we’re putting in airports is affecting the job and in turn passengers’ experiences.

Below is the first installment of these first hand accounts. Enjoy:

“Are you kidding?” was my immediate answer. And it was the plain truth. It was how I answered the question “Is this really a better checkpoint?” from the most recent group of VIP’s that were touring the checkpoint where I work.

We have seen plenty of them recently. I work at BWI airport’s Pier B where two years ago Southwest Airlines redid the entire wing of the airport and in the last two months TSA has installed the Checkpoint Evolution.

There is a lot I like about it. And while the uniforms, badges, mood lights and music grab a lot of attention, for me the star of the show is the new X-ray machines.

We call them "ATIX" on the floor. Google that and you get the formal name “Advanced Threat Identification X-rays.” We got Baltimore’s first two at my pier and the whole airport gets them by June. TSA’s Web site says that we bought hundreds more to install nationwide this year.

Not much of that matters to me. What does matter is how much better my 30 minute rotation at the X-Ray is now. Start with the screens. High resolution flat screen monitors make picking stuff out tons easier. Plus they look right. Nobody will miss squinting into those huge, heavy 1982-era computer screens that look like they belong in a museum.

And we are probably doing only half the bag checks we used to because we now have two angles to view the bag. Plus we don’t need a TSO to lug the bag back to the front to rerun it anymore because the officer physically searching the bag has the same view as the officer doing the first screening. It is not as good as the COBRA machine we tested here last year that lets you spin the image on the screen. But it is very good and is a big step forward from where we were.

The automatic threat boxes help too. They pick up items we may not have focused our attention on that could possibly be explosives. This is just another tool that helps us do our job better.

On the downside, it is not lightning fast. And I’m not as fast with it as I was with the old X-Ray machines. Not yet. But in the meantime I will take the tradeoff any day. And so would any passenger that trusts us with their safety.

Paula Furman

EoS Blog Contributor

Can someone explain why there are so many different lines to a checkpoint?

2008-05-30T22:00:00.002-04:00

Black/Blue/Green, First Class, Premier, Red Carpet-it seems like there are 18 different types of lines leading to a TSA checkpoint and only one for the "regular" traveler. What's the deal?

Well, there's the history and then there's where we're going.

Historically, TSA hasn't taken ownership over the security queue. This dates back to pre-9/11 and pre-TSA when airlines contracted with security companies to man checkpoints. Instead of taking control of the queues after 9/11 when we were established, we have relied upon the airport operator and the airlines to manage the queue for us so we could concentrate directly on screening passengers. This originally included checking passenger identification and boarding passes to ensure that only ticketed passengers were entering the queue and going through security. In general, TSA took the view that once you got to security, we treated everyone the same. Passengers may have progressed through the queue at a different speed, but they fed into the same security lines in the checkpoint itself.

In terms of real estate, the queue is not generally considered to be a part of the checkpoint. It's a part of the airport lobby where the line for people to enter into the checkpoint is setup. The actual screening takes place in the actual checkpoint. As a result, since it belonged to the airport, the airport operator and airline tenant were allowed to do what they wanted with it so long as everyone went through the checkpoint before they boarded their flight. Enter premium passenger lanes-without revenue coming to TSA. It was airport space, and we let the airport manage it.

Now for the Checkpoint Evolution view.

The first thing that our research on Checkpoint Evolution told us is that in terms of the passenger experience, the queue belongs to TSA-not entirely new to us, but something of which we should take more notice. We've tracked queue wait times for a long time; however, that data is used to make sure our airports are properly resourced, and our research has told us that the queue experience also has a critical element of which we needed to take notice. For example, inexperienced travelers and families feel like they need more time to prepare for screening, want more help with the process, and do not like being in the queue in front of a Road-Warrior traveler, tapping their foot, who doesn't really care about the queue experience as long as it moves quickly. (Road-Warriors can be irritated with the families and the slower travelers, but it's their lack of speed and not the fact they're a family that bothers them.)

So, we started looking for ways to put our research to good use with two goals in mind. First, we wanted to build a new environment that would make our behavioral observation programs more effective by helping to reduce the overall stress in the queue and the checkpoint. Second, we wanted to find a way to increase our efficiency and reduce x-ray alarm rates by allowing the fast passengers to move fast, and the slow passengers to take their time. End result - the "Black Diamond" pilot in Salt Lake City that joined the queue to the checkpoint and allowed passengers to pick a security line designed to meet their needs and let them move at their own pace (keeping Road-Warriors and the Families separate for the whole screening experience). For those new to the blog, "Black Diamond" was named after the ski logos that help snow skiers choose ski trails based on their level of difficulty.

The results were tremendously positive-especially with passengers who wanted an experience where they could take their time going through security. The queue and the security experience were much calmer for passengers, and our initial results show that the new multi-queue "Black Diamond" checkpoints are more efficient than regular checkpoints. We're now 20 airports later, and we're still seeing the same results. As a matter of fact, peak wait times at Salt Lake City this past Memorial Day weekend were about half as along as they were last year, even though the number of passengers going through the checkpoint actually went up by about 5 percent.

It's important to note that even under this new system, the queue still sits on airport real estate, so "Black Diamond" is only coming to a willing airport near you. TSA can't force an airport into a particular queue design-although more than a few airports are interested in the project. Security is a partnership between TSA, airport operators, airlines, and passengers, and TSA is looking to work with all comers. We're thankful for those airport operators who have been willing to experiment with us to build a better queue management mousetrap, but we also understand that airports have other needs, and even this project might not work everywhere.

Diamond lanes, family lanes, Elite lanes, whatever lanes, they all add up to a better experience for passengers and a safer environment for everyone.

Matt

EoS Blog Contributor

Which is it: Millimeter Wave or Backscatter?

2008-05-27T11:40:00.002-04:00

As TSA continues to deploy new technology, some people continue to be confused about whole body imagers. Millimeter wave, backscatter, privacy filters… it all adds up to a confused traveling public.

Since one of our readers asked about the difference between millimeter wave and backscatter images in a previous post and we’ve also seen other blogs get the two confused, we thought we’d put the correct information and images out there to clear up any misinformation. Both millimeter wave and backscatter fall under the classification of whole body imaging, which gives security officers a virtual image of a passenger that highlights potentially dangerous items.

Here’s the lowdown on the two technologies:

How millimeter wave works:

Beams of radio frequency (RF) energy in the millimeter wave spectrum are projected over the body’s surface at high speed from two antennas simultaneously as they rotate around the body.

The RF energy reflected back from the body or other objects on the body is used to construct a three-dimensional image.

The three-dimensional image of the body, with facial features blurred for privacy, is displayed on a remote monitor for analysis. The image is not saved – once it’s off the screen it’s gone forever.

This is the millimeter wave image a security officer sees:

A millimeter wave machine looks like this:

Here’s how Millimeter Wave imaging works (WMV, 3.4 MB).

Here’s how Millimeter Wave technology detects threats (WMV, 3.4 MB).

How backscatter works:

A narrow, low intensity X-ray beam is scanned over the body's surface at high speed.
The technology relies on the X-ray radiation that is reflected back from the body and other objects placed or carried on the body, where it is converted into a computer image, embedded with a modesty filter and displayed on a remote monitor.

Passengers will walk up to the backscatter unit, assisted by a transportation security officer and remain still for several seconds while the technology creates an image of the body.
Images will be deleted immediately once viewed and will never be stored, transmitted or printed (the passenger imaging units have zero storage capability).

This is the backscatter image the security officer sees:

This is a backscatter machine.

Click here to see a demonstration of backscatter (2Mb, wmv).

And while we’re at it:

Because we see it time and time again, we wanted to clear up another bit of misinformation. This is a raw backscatter image with NO privacy algorithm. This is NOT what security officers see – this image was used to show what the capabilities of the technology are.

Friday Afternoon Cartoons

2008-05-23T16:08:00.002-04:00

It’s funny, I’ve been with TSA for three years now and each and every previous major travel season, whether it’s Summer, Thanksgiving or whatever, the news media has forecasted a pending meltdown of the security system. As Mark Twain said, “Reports of my demise have been greatly exaggerated.”

This is the first year since we started in 2002 that the major focus of a holiday travel season isn’t on the good old T-S-A. Maybe that’s a sign of a maturing organization that has gotten it right for the past several years, maybe is a sign of higher gas prices and a pending presidential election, who knows.

Today, just like each of the past six Memorial Day weekends, we’re staffed up, ready to roll and screen anyone and everyone that arrives at a security checkpoint. Wait times so far are short, maybe because the Air Transport Association forecasts a 1 percent reduction in passengers from last year, but in large part because of the dedicated service of a great majority of our 46,000 officers--- most of which will be on the line (40,000 plus), screening passengers and baggage this holiday weekend.

So instead of some thought-provoking, controversial subject this weekend, we thought we’d try to entertain you with a couple of cartoons that caught our eye. And while our Sensitive Security Information (SSI) office is concerned that the New Yorker may have unveiled standard operating procedures (just kidding), and this guy certainly isn’t Simpliflying, we’ll take the risk to share their most recent cover with you.

Our compliments to the New Yorker and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution respectively.

Have a safe and enjoyable Memorial Day weekend.

Christopher
EOS Blog Team

The Science Behind 3-1-1

2008-05-19T20:13:00.004-04:00

Over the weekend, Fox News published a story about the UK liquids plot. Here’s an excerpt:

“Far-fetched as it sounds, bombs made from hydrogen peroxide and the breakfast powder drink Tang could have taken down seven planes bound for the U.S. and Canada - using flash cameras to trigger the explosions.

…The alleged plot, and the excellent police work that went into busting it, resulted in the tough carry-on restrictions passengers face before boarding an airplane. Knowing the dangers of liquid explosives should make the hassle of tossing your bottles when traveling a lot easier to bear.”

A recent BBC article described the liquid explosive:

“The alleged bombs would involve 500ml plastic bottles of the Oasis and Lucozade soft drinks. A sugary drink powder, Tang, would be mixed with hydrogen peroxide, used as a hair bleach, and other organic materials.

Hydrogen peroxide and the other ingredients can become explosive if mixed to a specific strength. Mr Wright said hydrogen peroxide had been used in "previous terrorist incidents".
The mixture would be injected into a bottle with the help of a syringe. The bottle's cap would not have been removed and the hole would have been resealed, said Mr Wright.

A second substance, a type of high explosive, would be hidden within an AA battery to form the small charge required to detonate the main bomb.

The charge would be detonated, said Mr Wright, by linking the bottle of explosives to a lightbulb and a disposable camera. The charge from the camera's flash unit would be enough to trigger the explosion, he said. The BBC has not comprehensively detailed the alleged bombs' composition.”

Since the 3-1-1 rule is a hot topic on the blog, I met with the head of TSA's Explosives Operations Division, Ed Kittel, to chat with him about the science behind 3-1-1. Before coming to TSA, Ed worked at the FAA Explosives Unit and Navy Explosives Ordnace Division. Ed was part of the team that investigated the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 and numerous other actual and suspected airplane bombings worldwide. Ed and his staff, in conjunction with other federal and international explosives experts, analyzed the UK explosives mixture, tactics, techniques, and procedures and tested its capabilities.

Lynn: One of the most frequent questions we get is: Is the UK mix a binary explosive?

Ed: While there were two primary ingredients, this composition is not a binary explosive; it is a “solution,” as one ingredient was to be dissolved into the other – making it possible to inject into a container using a syringe. The explosive was going to be pre-mixed, in a predetermined ratio, and carried onto the airplanes with an intact security seal. The remaining components of the bomb would have been separated during screening and hooked together later. All of the pieces were artfully concealed to attempt to “beat the system.” That’s why Transportation Security Officers are trained to detect individual components of improvised explosive devices, not just a fully assembled device.

Lynn: So with this UK liquid explosive, would the men be mixing the components at the airport or on the plane?

Ed: The liquid explosives solution was to be prepared at their safe house and injected into the sports drink bottles prior to coming to the airport. Additionally, we have seen no indication that they intended to combine the contents of multiple smaller bottles after screening.

Lynn: How did explosives testing play a part in creating the 3-1-1 rule?

Ed: As part of our analysis, we looked at some of the more likely liquid explosives recipes and compared them to descriptions contained in the intelligence reporting. Following a series of explosives tests of these materials performed by the federal government, we recommended the 3-1-1 protocol to senior TSA leadership as a viable alternative to the total liquids, gels and aerosols ban. Understandably, I cannot comment on the specifics of intelligence, formulations or the testing, nor would you want me to. By understanding and managing the risks associated with this threat, TSA was able to permit some exceptions for small quantities of liquids, aerosols and gels to be carried by the flying public. We also consulted with a number of our international partners to harmonize 3-1-1 countermeasures across the European Union and North America. TSA didn’t go this alone. In fact, this is the first time that the flying public has had the exact same security measures consistently applied across most of the world’s airports. It’s a model that we want to follow in the future.

TSA also introduced a number of other measures both at and beyond the screening checkpoints to minimize the risk of explosives getting onboard. The 3-1-1 protocol is only one of the multiple layers of security; many of which are invisible to the public. Passengers who need to have some small quantities of liquids, gels and aerosols may now do so, and 3-1-1 accommodates those needs while adding a significant level of security designed to protect the flights. Without 3-1-1, we would have had to maintain the total liquids ban, which was virtually unenforceable in the long-term, as it had a serious impact on checked baggage screening and cargo operations. Remember, the liquids, gels, and aerosols ban is all about the container and its ability to hold an explosive; it’s not about the original contents. Sometimes, people may not understand that and they become frustrated by the protocol as a result. You can be sure that we put our very best people on this, as did our Federal and international partners. 3-1-1 was the result of some excellent research by some of the best people our country has to offer.

Lynn: Is there anything else coming out of the UK trial that you find interesting or important to note?

Ed: The conspirators were very determined to beat airport screening systems by disguising all of their bomb components in common carry-on articles. Their goal was to destroy seven aircraft on the same day in nearly simultaneous attacks. This is very similar to Ramzi Yousef’s “Bojinka Plot” back in January 1995 in Asia. This case shows us that terrorists still consider airplanes to be major targets. As a result, TSA is continually looking at homemade and new explosives as well as artful concealment techniques to train our Transportation Security Officers. Our new Bomb Appraisal Officer (BAO) Program is placing hundreds of seasoned bomb technicians at airports nationwide to coordinate those efforts and improve screening to thwart these kinds of plots.

Lynn: Many say that the liquid threat is not scientifically possible. What do you have to say about that?

Ed: The U.S., UK, and other European security partners have all tested the liquid explosive that was planned to be used in that plot and we have all found that it is a viable liquid explosive. In fact, we have posted a video clip of one of these tests that was conducted by one of the National Labs out west. Make no mistake about it, this is the “real deal.”

We have also seen liquid explosives attacks before. For example, on November 29, 1987, Korean Airlines Flight 858 exploded over the Andaman Sea killing all 115 on board. North Korean agents conducted that attack using a liquid explosive concealed in a duty free whisky bottle. That attack used a different homemade liquid explosive but there are quite a few of them out there that are very powerful explosives.

Lynn

EoS Blog Team

UK Liquid Explosives Trial

2008-05-16T02:03:00.005-04:00

While American Idol fans debate the merits of the two Davids, across the pond, a terror trial has captured the attention of most of England and in fact the continent.

Eight alleged terrorists are on trial for planning to blow up seven airliners, five of which were destined for the U.S. While this trial is barely registering in the American press, had the plot succeeded, it would have been catastrophic, killing thousands of innocent passengers and rivaling 9/11 in its ferocity. It’s also the basis for one of our most controversial policies, 3-1-1.

Since 2006, U.S. and global explosives experts have been following this plot with great interest, because of its alleged use of novel explosives and methods. Until information became public during the trial, we have been extremely limited in what we could say about this plot. As the trial progresses, we are finally able to share information - things like the fact that the bottles of liquid explosives were pre-mixed, non-binary and would have almost certainly brought down those airliners;
things like showing the hollowed out batteries that would have hidden detonators; things like despite doing everything “right” this crew of alleged would-be killers would have walked right through airport security anywhere in the world under the rules at the time… Had it not been for intelligence leads, police intervention and eventual arrests there’s just no telling the eventual outcome of this diabolical plot.

Just this week, jurors were shown a video of the liquid explosive the suspected terrorists allegedly planned to use on airplanes. The liquid explosive mix was created in a government laboratory and placed in an Oasis soft drink bottle, just as the terrorists planned to do.

We will post more specific information on the plot as it is available and plan to post a Q&A with the chief of our explosives division on the plot and its ramifications here in the U.S. in the next few days. In the mean time, the Daily Telegraph of London has posted notes from the trial and the video shown to jurors here. We have also posted regular updates to the trial on our Web site, here.

Below is the liquid explosive video we prepared and released last year.

Christopher
EOS Blog Team

Checkpoint Lines - What Do You Think?

2008-05-12T22:30:00.001-04:00

I caught this article in the New York Times Sunday magazine over the weekend. Personally, I think the author (who didn’t talk to TSA for this piece) is confusing millimeter wave and backscatter, but that's not what caught my attention. His take on the lines before the checkpoint and who gets to go through quicker was interesting, and admittedly, we don't hear a lot about that. So we’d like to get your take on it.

Here's a snippet:

"Whether richer fliers should be allowed to cut in line at checkpoints is one of a family of problems that crop up when public spaces and private interests intersect, and selling off favored outcomes makes the public spaces more efficient. Some states let single drivers pay extra to use H.O.V. lanes. What looks to one person like flexibility looks to another like bribing your way through the system.

Although there is no principled argument for segregated airport security, maybe there is a pragmatic one. Elite travelers tend to be repeat travelers. As likely as not, they have had their luggage rummaged through three times in the past week, and the airlines - or their databases - know who they are. If there were some security-based system for speeding their transit, that would be great. Since there is no such system, maybe the rough-and-ready class system is (without meaning to be, of course) fair.”

Check out the entire article. Thanks for your feedback.

Lynn
EoS Blog Team

You asked for it...You got it, Millimeter Wave images.

2008-05-09T18:08:00.007-04:00

Here are the much requested, much anticipated, full body images of millimeter wave - both front and back, male and female just like so many of you asked for.

These were provided to TSA by the manufacturer of the technology, L-3. We asked L-3 to blur the facial features just like they are blurred when our officers see the images in Phoenix, Baltimore, LAX and JFK. These are exactly what officers see at airports today and will see in future deployments.

While we have said this many times, it bears repeating, TSA will not keep, store or transmit images. Once deleted, they are gone forever. For additional privacy, the officer viewing the image is in a separate room and will never see the passenger and the officer attending to the passenger will never see the image. The officers have 2-way radios to communicate with other in case a threat object is identified.I venture to say, Mikhail Baryshnikov may have exposed more in his ballet costume than these robotic images portray.

Why did we decide to put them up now? Because you've asked for it... Hopefully the editors of Reader's Digest will consider these for their next cover.

What do you think?

- Bob

05/10/08 6:10 p.m. Christopher said:

There have been a couple of incorrect assumptions made regarding the actual screening that I feel are important to clear up.

The actual scan itself takes about 2.5 seconds. That is the length of time a passenger should stand still in the machine (which is clear Plexiglas, allowing passengers to view their items as they come out of the x-ray used to inspect carry-on bags). The remaining time, between 15-45 seconds, is used by the officer at the remote viewing location to evaluate the image. During that time, the passenger can move around at will next to the machine while the officer attending the machine waits to hear via wireless comms that the image is free of any potential threats. This is an important point as ALL items must be removed from passenger's pockets prior to entering the millimeter wave machine because they will show up and must be removed to ensure they are not threat items.

A couple of bloggers have advocated for the officer viewing the image to be out in the public area. We specifically require the remote location to protect the privacy of passengers using the machine. We just don’t think it’s appropriate for other passengers, airport, airline employees or just anybody walking by to see the images, much less snap a photo with a camera phone or anything else and post that image to TMZ.com or who knows where. That’s also why officers are not allowed to bring anything, including phones, bags or other items into the remote viewing location.

While we’re still collecting acceptance stats, the early word is that a great majority (more than 85 percent) of passengers prefer using this machine in lieu of a pat-down, which contrary to one poster takes much longer than 5 seconds and requires physical contact.

Hope this information helps.

Christopher
EoS Blog Team